The ongoing CAESAR competition launched in 2013, aimed to design authenticated encryption schemes for different applications and environments, attracted 57 submissions as candidates. Out of the 57 round 1 submissions, only 29 candidates were selected for round 2. Each of these candidates is to be analyzed carefully. Among these 29 candidates, ACORN is a family of Lightweight Authenticated Ciphers with Associated Data (AEAD). In this paper we propose a hard fault attack on both the versions of ACORN in a nonce-respecting scenario whereby a random bit of the fifth LFSR is permanently stuck at the value '1' before the driving procedure of the encryption device. Without the repetition of the same key-IV pair, this is the first work that we are aware of, where the secret key can be recovered fully with a computational complexity well below the limit of brute force search. With hard fault at a certain position the attack complexity reduces to 255.85. © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.